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Abstract
We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational
individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players
are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation
and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and
provide conditions under which play evolves to an imitation equilib-
rium; convergence is conditional on the network of social interaction.
We then illustrate, through example, how imitation and innovation
can complement each other; in particular, we demonstrate how imita-
tion can help a population to learn to play a Nash equilibrium where
more rational methods do not. This leads to our main result in which
we provide a general class of large game for which the imitation with
innovation dynamic almost surely converges to an approximate Nash,
imitation equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic models of learning in games can provide insights on when and how
a population of boundedly rational players can learn to play a Nash equilib-
rium. The limits to individual rationality and the importance of the Nash
equilibrium concept in economics and game theory make an understanding
of such issues fundamental. In this paper we study learning in games with
many players. The complexity of these games, as suggested by the large
number of players, makes anything approaching rational behavior seem un-
likely. We provide, however, suﬃcient conditions on behavior to ensure that
play will converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium for a general class of
large game.
We model a learning dynamic in which players are assumed to imitate
and innovate. More precisely, each player uses interchangeably two decision
making heuristics - an imitation heuristic and an innovation heuristic. Be-
fore detailing these heuristics and our results, we brießy outline our principle
motivations for assuming such behavior. These are twofold; Þrst, a belief
that these two heuristics capture key aspects of individual behavior in large
games, and second, a belief that learning through the combination of imita-
tion with innovation is likely to lead to the emergence of Nash equilibrium
play. We expand on these motivations in turn.
It is widely accepted that individual behavior is partly motivated by
social inßuences, such as desires for popularity or acceptance, and that such
behavior can lead to imitation (see, for example, Jones 1984 and Bernheim
1994). An individual may also be motivated to learn through imitation
when he has imperfect information about his payoﬀ function or his strategy
set. When faced with such incomplete information, imitation is a means
through which a player can draw on and learn from the collective experience
of others (Young 2001b). Note that a players lack of information may or
may not reßect bounds on his rationality. Experimental evidence of social
inßuence and imitation in the economic literature is provided by, amongst
others, Selten and Apesteguia (2002) and Oﬀerman, Potters and Sonnemans
(forthcoming). The importance of conformity and imitation has long been
recognized in psychology and sociology (see, for example Asch 1952, Deutsch
and Gerard 1955 and for a more modern discussion Gross 1996).
An obvious limitation of imitation is that it leaves little room for nov-
elty or originality. This suggests that imitation is not and cannot be the
sole constituent of learning. Novelty could be seen to arise from experimen-
tation or mistakes but individual behavior appears more purposeful than
this (even in complex games). For example, Selten and Apesteguia (2002)
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and Oﬀerman et. al. (forthcoming), in running experiments with Cournot
interaction type games, Þnd evidence of both imitation and of attempts to
initiate cooperation or collusion; purposeful attempts by some subjects to
increase individual payoﬀs appeared to be apparent (even though subjects
were not aware of the payoﬀ structure of the game). The innovation heuristic
is motivated to capture such unilateral behavior whereby a player attempts
to increase his payoﬀ.
Not only do we believe an imitation with innovation dynamic can cap-
ture key aspects of individual behavior, we also feel it is likely to lead to the
emergence of Nash equilibrium play. Intuitively, diﬀerent heuristics can be
associated with diﬀerent advantages and disadvantages. Imitation, for exam-
ple, appears to be a dynamic in which the actions of individuals will become
coordinated in the sense that one strategy proÞle emerges as a convention
or focal point. The lack of innovation, however, implies that such a strategy
proÞle need not be individually rational. Vega-Redondo (1997) and Selten
and Ostmann (2000), for example, model variants on an imitation dynamic
and demonstrate that play may converge to a strategy proÞle that is not a
Nash equilibrium. By contrast, any stable state of an innovation dynamic
should be individually rational. Given, however, that each individual acts
in isolation there is less opportunity for the actions of individuals to become
congruent. In particular, a player may neither directly or indirectly predict
the behavior that can be expected of others. Illustrations of how adaptive
play (similar to an innovation dynamic) need not converge to a Nash equilib-
rium are provided by, amongst others, Young (1993, 2001a). Suppose that a
player uses more than one heuristic. The advantages of one heuristic could
potentially compensate for the disadvantages of another. Imitation and in-
novation appear to be two types of behavior that are particularly suited to
complement each other. Gale and Rosenthal (2001) provide some evidence
for this in demonstrating how Nash equilibrium outcomes can arise from
imitation and innovation. The results of this paper provide further evidence
in a relatively more general context.
As stated above, the dynamic we model assumes that players use in-
terchangeably and imitation and an innovation heuristic. The imitation
heuristic is based in part on a model of imitation used by Selten and Ost-
mann (2000). A player imitates by referring to a subset of the population -
his reference group - and by copying the action of the most successful player.
The sophistication in this behavior comes from referring to a speciÞc sub-
set of the population (which may have been carefully selected) and in only
imitating the most successful players referred to. These two properties of
the imitation heuristic distinguish our approach from much of the previous
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literature on imitation. For example, many authors (e.g. Kandori, Mailath
and Rob 1993, Ellison and Fudenberg 1993, Vega-Redondo 1997 and Alos-
Ferrer, Ania and Schenk-Hoppe 2000) model a dynamic in which each player
can be seen to refer to the total player set. An alternative (e.g. Kirman
1993 and Ellison and Fudenberg 1995) is to assume players refer to a random
sample of the population; under such an assumption a player will only refer
to a subset of the population in any one period but, over time, may refer to
everyone within the population. We also note that many authors (e.g. Kir-
man 1993, Levine and Pesendorfer 2000, 2001 and Gale and Rosenthal 2001)
model a dynamic in which players do not necessarily imitate the successful
but instead, conform to the actions of others in the sense that a player
chooses the strategy he observes being played most often. The literature on
imitation is considered in more detail in section 2.2.
In using the innovation heuristic a player chooses an action that will,
ceteris paribus, increase his payoﬀ. This suggests that a player acts on the
basis that other players will not subsequently change strategy. In games
with many players attempts to second guess the behavior of opponents
may be diﬃcult if not impossible. Also, much experimental evidence sup-
ports the notion that individuals act on the basis of recent past experience
(Selten 1998). Thus, it seems reasonable that a player should act on the
assumption that the actions of other players will not change. We highlight
that innovation is similar to but not the same as a best response or myopia
dynamic, as commonly deÞned and much studied (see Fudenberg and Levine
1998). A player behaving myopically chooses a strategy that, ceteris paribus,
maximizes their payoﬀ. Thus, in behaving myopically a player chooses the
best strategy; this may diﬀer from someone innovating who merely has to
choose a better strategy. Innovation requires less rationality on the part of
players than myopia.
Our analysis of the imitation with innovation learning dynamic begins be
assuming that players only imitate. This leads to the deÞnition of an imita-
tion equilibrium - a state stable under the imitation dynamic. An imitation
equilibrium has the property that players who refer to each other typically
play the same strategy. It need not be a Nash equilibrium. Note, however,
that if players have a desire for equality, or what they may perceive as fair-
ness, an imitation equilibrium may be an intuitively appealing concept of
equilibrium. Individuals do appear to be inßuenced by fairness considera-
tions. For example, wages may be judged in relation to the wages of others
(Clark and Oswald 1996). Also, fairness appears to inßuence bargaining in
experimental studies (see Chapter 4 of Kagel and Roth 1995).
Our Þrst main result provides suﬃcient conditions under which an im-
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itation dynamic almost surely converges to an imitation equilibrium. We
recall that players may imitate those in their reference group. A reference
network details the reference group of every player. Theorem 1 states that
if the reference network has a clustering coeﬃcient of one then play will
evolve, almost surely, to an imitation equilibrium. A reference network has
a clustering coeﬃcient of one if whenever a player i refers to players j and k,
both players j and k refer to each other. Many social and economic networks
have clustering coeﬃcients near one (Granovetter 1973 and D. Watts 1999).
Note that Theorem 1 requires no assumption on the game being played.
Having looked at an imitation dynamic in some detail we turn our at-
tention to the imitation with innovation dynamic. A stable state of such
a dynamic is an approximate Nash, imitation equilibrium. We begin with
three examples that demonstrate how learning through imitation and learn-
ing through innovation may, or may not, complement each other. Example
5, for instance, provides a game and reference network where (1) an imitation
dynamic need not converge to an imitation equilibrium, (2) an innovation
dynamic need not converge to a Nash equilibrium, yet (3) an imitation with
innovation dynamic will converge, almost surely, to a Nash, imitation equi-
librium.
For our main result we use the concept of a pregame satisfying the large
game property as introduced by Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2001). A
principle component of a pregame is a set of player attributes. In games
induced from a pregame satisfying a large game property the payoﬀ of a
player is essentially a function of the proportions of players with each at-
tribute playing each strategy (and his own strategy). Our Theorem 2 states
that, subject to relatively mild assumptions, in any suﬃciently large game
induced from a pregame satisfying the large game property the imitation
with innovation dynamic converges, almost surely, on an approximate Nash,
imitation equilibrium. We note how players learn not only to play an approx-
imate Nash equilibrium but also an imitation equilibrium. Indeed, players
use pure strategies throughout and so play converges to an approximate
Nash, imitation equilibrium in pure strategies.
Our main result demonstrates how approximate Nash equilibrium play
can emerge in large games if players learn through imitation and innovation.
Similar results were obtained by Gale and Rosenthal (1999) in the context
of interaction in a Cournot like model. An appealing aspect of our results
are the generality of game modelled. The previous literature on learning
has typically focussed on games where the existence of a Nash equilibrium
is trivial (e.g. Vega-Redondo 1997, Levine and Pesendorfer 2000, 2001 and
Gale and Rosenthal 1999). This is not the case in the game we model.
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This is highlighted by the fact that through a corollary of Theorem 2 we
are able to contribute to the literature on the existence of pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in large games (e.g. Schmeidler 1973, Mas-Colell 1984
and Wooders et. al. 2001). In particular, the fact that play converges to an
approximate Nash, imitation equilibrium demonstrates that one must exist;
this complements existence results due to Wooders et. al. (2001).
A second aspect of our main result is the suggestion that imitation can
be consistent with individually rational play in games with many players.
This complements results due to Wooders et. al. (2001) who demonstrate
that, in large games, there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium in which
similar players play similar strategies. Note, that the question of whether
players learn to play this equilibrium is not addressed by Wooders et al.;
for a slightly less general class of game, Theorem 2 demonstrates that this
equilibrium will indeed emerge. Related results on the individual rationality
of imitation are due to Schlag (1998, 1999) and Ellison and Fudenberg (1993,
1995). In varying contexts these authors show how imitative learning can
lead to the adoption of optimal actions.
There are many further relationships between this paper and the lit-
erature on learning in games. We highlight two. First, there is a large
literature, not mentioned above, on the convergence of learning dynamics to
Nash equilibrium play. Much of this literature considers learning dynamics
very diﬀerent from ours such as Þctitious play or the replicator dynamic (see
Fudenberg and Levine 1998). Often the diﬀering choice of dynamic reßects
the type of game to be studied (see, for example Kalai and Lehrer 1993).
The literature that has used learning dynamics more comparable to ours has
principally addressed the issue of equilibrium selection (e.g. Young 1993,
Robson and Vega-Redondo 1996 and Levine and Pesendorfer 2000, 2001).
More precisely, learning has been modelled in games where the convergence
of play to a Nash equilibrium appears trivial, the question of interest has
been which type of equilibrium is more likely to emerge. We have relatively
little to say on the issue of equilibrium selection other than suggesting that
an imitation equilibrium may be more likely to emerge.
We proceed as follows; in Section 2 we outline the model and introduce
the imitation and innovation heuristics. In Section 3 we analyze a dynamic
in which players only use imitation. In Section 4 we add innovation before
looking at learning in large games in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Two
appendices present generalizations of our main results.
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2 The model
Let N = {1, ..., n} denote a Þnite player set and let S = ©s1, ...., sKª denote
a Þnite strategy set. A strategy vector is given by σ = (σ1, ..., σn) ∈ Sn where
σi is interpreted as the strategy of player i. Throughout it will be assumed
that players do not play mixed strategies. Let Σ denote the set of strategy
vectors. A stage game is given by a tuple (N,S, {ui}ni=1) consisting of a
Þnite player set N , Þnite strategy set S and a payoﬀ function ui : Σ → R
for each player i ∈ N .
Given a stage game Γ, play is assumed to evolve over discrete time
periods, indexed, t = 0, 1, 2, .... In each period t the stage game Γ is played.
Every player i ∈ N is assumed to choose a strategy for period t conditional
on the strategy vector of the previous period t− 1. The evolution of play is
therefore modelled as a discrete time homogenous Markov chain {σ(t)}t≥0 on
state space Σ. The transition matrix of the Markov chain will be denoted by
P . The value Pσσ0 is interpreted as the probability of state σ0 immediately
following state σ.
We model the behavior of players using an imitation with innovation
dynamic. This dynamic postulates that players use a combination of imi-
tation and innovation in choosing a strategy to play. If a player decides to
imitate then he uses an imitation heuristic while if he decides to innovate
he uses an innovation heuristic. A players probability of innovation details
the likelihood that he will innovate. We introduce in turn the imitation
and innovation heuristics before formally deÞning the imitation with inno-
vation dynamic. First, however, we deÞne a reference network; the imitation
heuristic makes use of such a network.
2.1 Reference network
Given a player set N a reference matrix R is an N × N Boolean matrix
R = [rij ]. If element rij = 1 we say that player i refers to player j while if
rij = 0 we say that player i does not refer to player j. We set rii = 1 for
all i ∈ N . That is, a player is assumed to refer to themselves. We do not
assume that R is symmetric. We will also refer to a reference matrix R as a
reference network. Given a reference network R, for each player i ∈ N , let
Ri be the subset of N such that j ∈ Ri if and only if rij = 1. We refer to Ri
as the reference group of player i. Thus, player j belongs to the reference
group of player i if and only if player i refers to player j.1
1Given the reference matrix R the reference group Ri of player i could be thought of
as the ith row of R.
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We will assume that the reference network remains constant throughout
the evolution of play. It will become clear, as we proceed, that the reference
network can be crucial in determining how play evolves. This suggests that
a player may wish to change his reference group as he learns more about
the game and his fellow players. In an Appendix we model this possibility
by assuming that players use a good advice heuristic to choose a reference
group (as well as a strategy) in each period. We are able to show that the
main conclusions of the paper are unaﬀected by this freedom in reference
group choice.
2.2 Imitation heuristic
The imitation heuristic represents a procedure that a player i can use to
choose a strategy for current period t conditioning on the strategy vector
of the previous period t − 1. This heuristic closely resembles an imitation
dynamic introduced by Selten and Ostmann (2000). The heuristic can be
summarized under an imitation probability function pi : Σ → ∆(S) where
the value pi(sk|σ) is interpreted as the probability that a player i, using
the imitation heuristic, would select the strategy sk if strategy vector σ was
played in the previous period. When using the imitation heuristic a player
can be seen to progress through three stages. These are outlined below for
a player i choosing a strategy conditional on strategy vector σ. A reference
network R is assumed.
1. Identify costrategists: the set of costrategists of player i, denoted Ci(σ),
are those players l ∈ Ri such that σl = σi.
2. identify success examples: a success example of player i is a player
j ∈ Ri such that
uj(σ) = max
l∈Ri
ul(σ)
3. choose strategy: player i chooses strategy sk ∈ S with probability
pi(s
k|σ) where (a) if there is a success example j of player i such that
σj = s
k then pi(sk|σ) > 0, and (b) if every success example of player
i is a costrategist of player i then pi(σi|σ) = 1.
In identifying a set of costrategists player i identiÞes those players to
whom she refers and who play the same strategy as herself. Note that player
i must belong to the set of costrategists of player i. A success example of
player i is any player j who earns the highest payoﬀ of any player referred to
by i. Note that player i may be a success example for player i. In choosing a
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strategy player i may choose the same strategy as a success example. That
is, she may imitate a success example. If every success example of player
i is also a costrategist then player i will play the same strategy as in the
previous period.
We highlight that the imitation heuristic is fairly vague about a players
behavior. In particular, if player i has the option of changing strategy (be-
cause she has a success example who is not a costrategist) then the possibility
is left open for her to potentially choose any strategy. This means she may,
for example, experiment, make mistakes or choose the same strategy as in a
previous period. Many authors (e.g. Young 1993 and Vega-Redondo 1997)
assume that players either choose strategies sequentially, i.e. one person
per period, or have some positive probability of not changing strategy. Our
results apply to these types of dynamic. We note, however, that a player
using the imitation heuristic may always imitate success examples. Thus
the possibility of mistakes or experimentation etc. is not required for our
results.
The imitation heuristic allows the possibility that a player i may imitate
a non-costrategist who is earning the same payoﬀ as one of her costrategists.
This implies, in particular, that she may imitate a non-costrategist who is
earning the same payoﬀ as herself. Consider an imitation heuristic with
inertia. This heuristic is identical to that of the imitation heuristic with one
modiÞcation: a player j can be a success example of player i when σj 6= σi
if and only if
uj(σ) = max
l∈Ri
ul(σ) > max
k∈Ci(σ)
uk(σ).
In this case player i may only change strategy through imitation if there
is a success example earning a strictly higher payoﬀ than any of her own
costrategists. This creates inertia in that a player is less likely to change
strategy. In the main body of the paper we assume throughout that the
imitation heuristic is used by players (as opposed to the imitation heuristic
with inertia). This has the advantage of simplifying the analysis. In an
appendix we consider in more detail possible diﬀerences if players use the
imitation heuristic with inertia. We demonstrate, through example, that the
type of heuristic used can signiÞcantly alter the evolution of play. Despite
this, however, we show how analogs to our two main theorems can still be
derived.
The imitation heuristic can be compared to similar behavioral rules in
the literature. Imitation heuristics can diﬀer primarily in two aspects - Þrst,
who a player refers to, and second, how a player interprets the information
he receives. We discuss each of these aspects in turn. Before doing so we
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highlight that the heuristic used by Selten and Ostmann (2000) is equivalent
to the imitation heuristic with inertia, while the heuristics used by Kandori,
Mailath and Rob (1993), Vega-Redondo (1997) and Alos-Ferrer, Ania and
Schenk-Hoppe (2000) can be seen as a special case of the imitation heuristic
for which Ri = N for all i ∈ N .2 We note that these authors assume that
players use varying forms of experimentation in supplement to imitation.
This contrasts with the approach of this paper where players use innovation.
Most of the literature assumes that players refer to the entire player
set, that is Ri = N for all i ∈ N (for example Kandori et. al. 1993,
Vega-Redondo 1997, Gale and Rosenthal 1999, Levine and Pesendorfer 2000,
2001 and Alos-Ferrer et. al. 2000). Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) consider a
model in which players refer to those close to them in terms of some spatial
distribution; we will use a similar notion in Section 5. Another alternative,
as used by Kirman (1993), Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and Schlag (1997,
1999) is that a player refers to a random sample of the population. In this
way a player only refers to a subset of the population in any one period
but can potentially refer to the entire player set. This random sampling is
not permitted according to the imitation heuristic. In Section 7, however,
we allow players to change their reference group thus permitting random
sampling.
There are various ways that a player can interpret the information he re-
ceives. As with the imitation heuristic modelled in this paper, Vega-Redondo
(1997) and Alos-Ferrer et. al. (2000), amongst others, model a heuristic in
which a player can be said to imitate the most successful player that he
observes. Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) consider a heuristic in which a
player could be said to imitate the most successful strategy that he observes
in the sense that a player chooses the strategy that he observed as giving
the highest average payoﬀ.3 By contrast, the imitation heuristics modelled
by Kirman (1993), Gale and Rosenthal (1999) and Levine and Pesendor-
fer (2000, 2001) assume that players conform to the average strategy of
the population; thus, players does not imitate strategies according to their
success but according to their popularity. Ellison and Fudenberg (1993)
consider a heuristic in which players imitate strategies only if they are both
successful and popular. Other possibilities and a discussion of this issue is
2All these dynamics assume a player has the option to choose the same strategy as in
the previous period.
3Suppose player i refers to three players - himself and players k and j. Further, suppose
players i and k play strategy A and get payoﬀs of 0 and 100 respectively while player j
plays strategy B and gets payoﬀ 90. If player i imitates the most successful player he will
imitate player k. If he imitates the most successful strategy he will play strategy B.
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provided by Schlag (1997, 1999).
We make one Þnal comment. Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), Robson and
Vega-Redondo (1996) and Schlag (1997, 1999) model games of imperfect
information. Players are assumed to imitate on the basis of observed or
realized payoﬀs. Our framework permits games of imperfect information.
We implicitly assume, however, that players imitate on the basis of expected
payoﬀs and not realized payoﬀs (see Robson and Vega-Redondo 1996 for a
discussion of this issue).
2.3 Innovation heuristic
In a similar way to the imitation heuristic, the innovation heuristic can be
summarized by an innovation probability function mi : Σ → ∆(S). The
value mi(sk|σ) is interpreted as the probability that a player i, using the
innovation heuristic, would select the strategy sk if strategy vector σ was
played in the previous period. Let ε ≥ 0 be a real number referred to as
an inertia parameter. A player using the innovation heuristic when strat-
egy vector σ was observed in the previous period will proceed through the
following two stages,
1. Identify innovation opportunities: an innovation opportunity for player
i is a strategy sk ∈ S such that
ui(s
k, σ−i) > ui(σ) + ε.
2. choose strategies: player i chooses strategy sk ∈ S with probability
mi(s
k|σ) where (a) if there are no innovation opportunities for player
i then mi(σi|σ) = 1, and, (b) if there is an innovation opportunity for
player i then mi(sk|σ) > 0 for some strategy sk that is an innovation
opportunity.
If a player could have improved upon her payoﬀ by more than ε in
the previous period then she has an innovation opportunity. If she has no
innovation opportunities then she uses the same strategy as in the previous
period. If, however, a player does have an innovation opportunity then there
must be a positive probability that she plays at least one of her innovation
opportunities. It is important to note that mi(sk|σ) can be zero even if sk
is an innovation opportunity. For example, a player need not, necessarily,
choose the innovation opportunity that would have maximized her payoﬀ
in the previous period. This contrasts with the imitation heuristic where
it is assumed that every success example is imitated with some positive
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probability. We note that the possibility for mistakes, experimentation and
inertia exist in the innovation heuristic to the same extent as they did in
the imitation heuristic.
The innovation heuristic is similar to best response or myopic behavior
as modelled by many authors (see Fudenberg and Levine 1998). There are,
however, important diﬀerences. First, ε is commonly assumed to be zero.
Second, when using myopia a player always chooses a strategy that would
have maximized her payoﬀ in the previous period. As we have noted, when
using an innovation heuristic the probability that she play such a strategy
may be zero. This would suggest that the innovation heuristic requires less
computation to perform. This suggests, in turn, that a less rational player
is capable of innovating.
2.4 The imitation with innovation dynamic
It remains to combine the imitation and innovation heuristics to form the
imitation with innovation dynamic. The Þnal element we introduce is the
vector of innovation probabilities λ ∈ RN where λi ∈ [0, 1] is referred to as
the innovation probability of player i. The value λi is the probability with
which player i uses the innovation heuristic with the imitation heuristic used
otherwise. Thus, if λi = 1 player i always uses the innovation heuristic to
select a strategy while if λi = 0 player i always uses the imitation heuristic.
We say that λ = 0 if λi = 0 for all i ∈ N and similarly λ = 1 if λi = 1 for
all i ∈ N . We say that λ 6= 0, 1 if λi ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ N .4
Given a set of imitation probability functions {pi}ni=1, a set of innovation
probability functions {mi}ni=1 and vector of innovation probabilities λ we can
derive the transition matrix P . The resulting stochastic process is referred
to as the imitation with innovation dynamic which we indicate as I(p;m;λ).
It proves more convenient to characterize the imitation with innovation dy-
namic according to the inertia parameter ε, innovation probabilities λ and
reference matrix R. We thus denote by I(ε;λ;R) any imitation with inno-
vation dynamic that is consistent with the three characteristics indicated.5
We highlight that the imitation with innovation dynamic does not have
persistent randomness. That is, there are stable states of the dynamic (as
4The value of λi could be made conditional on the strategy vector and our results still
apply. That is, the probability a player innovates could depend on the strategy vector of
the previous period.
5The value of ε and a reference network R are insuﬃcient to identify the set of functions
p and m. Note, however, that the set of funtions p and m may be consistent with a unique
value for ε and a unique reference matrix R.
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will be demonstrated in Sections 3 and 4). The approach we use contrasts
with much of the existing literature. Typically, there is assumed to be
some positive probability that a player experiments by randomly selecting
an arbitrary strategy. This persistent randomness implies the system can
never be absorbed into a stable state. Dynamics for which there is not
persistent randomness are studied by Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995)
and Blume (1993, 1995). Blume (1995) discusses this issue in more detail.
3 The dynamics of imitation
We begin our analysis of the imitation with innovation dynamic by assuming
that λ = 0. That is, by assuming that players only ever use the imitation
heuristic to select a strategy. We deÞne a static equilibrium concept.6
Imitation Equilbirum: The strategy vector σ is an imitation equilibrium
of stage game Γ relative to reference network R if
max
l∈Ri/Ci(σ)
ul(σ) < max
l∈Ci(σ)
ul(σ)
for all i ∈ N , where we recall that Ci(σ) denotes the set of costrategists
of player i for strategy vector σ.
If the state of the system is an imitation equilibrium then no player i ∈ N
has a success example who is not a costrategist and, as such, no player will
wish to change strategy. This immediately suggests Lemma 1, which we
state without proof. We note that an imitation equilibrium need not be
such that every player plays the same strategy. Indeed a player need not
play the same strategy as those he refers to.
Lemma 1: A state σ is an absorbing state of the imitation with inno-
vation dynamic I(ε;λ = 0;R) if and only if it is an imitation equilibrium of
stage game Γ relative to R.
This result demonstrates that the Markov process described by the im-
itation with innovation dynamic when λ = 0 is not irreducible. That is,
there are many absorbing states. This follows from the observation that any
strategy vector σ in which every player i ∈ N plays the same strategy is an
6An imitation equilibrium as deÞned in this paper is essentially equivalent to a des-
tination as deÞned by Selten and Ostmann (2000). Selten and Ostmann (2000) require
that an imitation equilibrium also be robust to possible deviations by success leaders.
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imitation equilibrium. If all communication classes of the dynamic are sin-
gletons then Lemma 1 implies that the imitation with innovation dynamic
will converge, almost surely, to an imitation equilibrium. In general, how-
ever, there may exist non-singleton communication classes. That is, there
may exist a communication class Ψ where |Ψ| > 1 and wherePq∈Ψ pσq = 1
for all σ ∈ Ψ. An example illustrates.
Example 1: There are 3 players and 2 strategies, labelled A and B. The
reference network is such that R1 = {1, 2}, R2 = {1, 2, 3} and R3 = {2, 3}.
Thus, player 2, for example, refers to players 1, 2 and 3. Two strategy vectors
are of interest.
strategy vector payoﬀ vector
A,B,B 4, 0, 2
A,A,B 2, 0, 4
There exists a communication class in which we see constant repetition of
the strategy vectors (A,B,B) and (A,A,B). Basically, players 1 and 3 do
not change strategy while player 2, by contrast, switches between strategies
B and A, motivated by observing players earning a payoﬀ of 4.¨
The cycle of play that we observe in Example 1 appears to reßect the
reference network. One important characteristic of a network is its clustering
coeﬃcient. This is a measure of the cliquishness of the network.7
Clustering coeﬃcient: We say that a reference network R has a cluster-
ing coeﬃcient of one when
1. for any three distinct players i, j, k ∈ N if j, k ∈ Ri then k ∈ Rj
and j ∈ Rk.8
2. |Ri| ≥ 3 for every player i ∈ N .9
Thus, if a player i ∈ N refers to both players j and k and the network R
has a clustering coeﬃcient of one then player j must refer to player k and
7See D. Watts (1999) and references there in for a deÞnition and discussion.
8Given that i ∈ Ri it may appear that this condition implies symmetry of the network
R whereby if j ∈ Ri it must be the case that i ∈ Rj . The fact, however, that players i, j, k
must be distinct means that the network need not be symmetric.
9The requirement that |Ri| ≥ 3 is a minor assumption to rule out problems in deÞning
the clustering coeﬃcient if |Ri| < 3. We recall that i ∈ Ri.
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player k refer to player j. We note that the reference network in Example 1
does not have a clustering coeﬃcient of one; player 2 refers to players 1 and
3 but player 3 does not refer to player 1, nor player 1 refer to player 3. We
state our Þrst main result.
Theorem 1: For any stage game Γ and any reference network R that
has a clustering coeﬃcient of one the imitation with innovation dynamic
I(ε;λ = 0;R) almost surely converges on an imitation equilibrium.
Proof: Given an arbitrary state σ we demonstrate that there exists
states, indexed, σ(2), ..., σ(T ) where Pσσ(2) > 0, Pσ(t)σ(t+1) > 0 for all T−1 ≥
t ≥ 2 and where σ(T ) is an imitation equilibrium. Assume that every player
i ∈ N in every period always chooses the same strategy as a success example.
Furthermore, assume that there is an ordering to strategies (the same for all
players) whereby if a player i has more than one success example he selects
the strategy of the success example playing the smallest strategy. This
behavior is consistent with a deterministic process that occurs with positive
probability under the imitation with innovation dynamic.
Consider an arbitrary player i ∈ N for whom there exists a player j ∈ Ri,
j 6= i such that i ∈ Rj . For any player k ∈ N such that k ∈ Ri, given that
the reference network R has a clustering coeﬃcient of one, it must be the
case that k ∈ Rj and j ∈ Rk. This, in turn, implies that i ∈ Rk. Similarly,
if there exists a player l ∈ Rj then l ∈ Ri and i, j ∈ Rl. Thus, Rj = Ri for
all j ∈ Ri. We refer to the set Ri as a clique; every player within a clique
refers to, and only to, all other players in the clique. Given the behavior
assumed of players, in state σ(2) there must exist some sk ∈ S such that
σj = s
k for all j ∈ Ri. That is, all players in the clique play the same
strategy. This implies that no player j ∈ Ri can have a success example in
states σ(2), σ(3), ... who is not a costrategist. Thus, no player i belonging
to a clique can change strategy between states σ(2), σ(3), ....
Consider an arbitrary player i ∈ N for whom there does not exist a player
j ∈ Ri, j 6= i such that i ∈ Rj . Suppose that there exists a player k ∈ N
such that i ∈ Rk. Given that the network R has a clustering coeﬃcient of
one there must exist a player j 6= i such that j ∈ Rk. Further, if i, j ∈ Rk
this implies that i ∈ Rj and j ∈ Ri. This is a contradiction. Thus, i /∈ Rk
for all k ∈ N\{i}. We say that player i does not belong to a clique. Player
i does, however, refer to a subset of a clique. This is immediate from the
analysis of the previous paragraph and the fact that i refers to at least two
distinct players j, k who must refer to each other. Given that player i refers
to a subset of a clique in states σ(2), σ(3), ... every player referred to by
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player i (with the possible exception of themselves) must be playing the
same strategy. Thus, if there is a success example of player i who is not a
costrategist in some state σ(ti) there cannot be a success example of player
i in any subsequent state unless they are costrategists of i. Given that the
player set is Þnite there must exist some ti such that for every state σ(t),
t ≥ ti, player i does not have a success example who is not a costrategist.
This completes the proof.¥
Given that a reference network which has a clustering coeﬃcient of one
is suﬃcient to guarantee convergence on an imitation equilibrium we may
ask whether or not it is necessary. Example 1 demonstrates that for any
reference network R in which there are three players i, j, k where j ∈ Ri
and k ∈ Ri but k /∈ Rj or j /∈ Rk, a game Γ can be constructed for which
the imitation with innovation dynamic has a non-singleton communication
class. We cannot go any further this, however, as the following example
demonstrates.
Example 2: There are 3 players and the reference network is such that
R1 = {1, 2, 3}, R2 = {2, 3} and R3 = {3}. The network R does not have a
clustering coeﬃcient of one. For any game Γ, however, the imitation with
innovation dynamic I(ε;λ = 0;R) almost surely converges to an imitation
equilibrium. To demonstrate, we proceed by contradiction. We note that
player 3 cannot change strategy, so suppose player 3 is playing some strategy
A. Player 2 can either be playing strategy A or not. If at any point player
2 imitates then he will play strategy A for all subsequent periods. Finally,
we consider player 1. If play is not to converge on an imitation equilibrium
then player 1 must repeatedly change strategy through imitation. Note,
however, that if player 1 imitates player 3 then so can player 2. Thus, both
players 2 and 3 will almost surely end up playing strategy A. This leads to
a contradiction.
This example could be objected to on the grounds that player 3 only
refers to himself. The example can, however, easily be amended, with the
same conclusions, to one in which every player refers to at least three other
players.¨
We conclude this section with a discussion of the likelihood that economic
and social networks have a clustering coeﬃcient of one. An illustration
of a familiar economic network may be useful - consider Þrms competing
in a market. Many markets, such as food retail, are composed of a small
number of large, dominate Þrms and a large number of small, fringe Þrms.
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Firms can be expected to refer to the actions of competitors in order to
gauge variables such as prices and marketing strategy. The following type
of reference network seems plausible - (a) the large Þrms refer to each other,
ignoring the small Þrms, while (b) the small Þrms refer solely to a subset of
the large Þrms. This network would have a clustering coeﬃcient of one.
Speaking more generally, it is unlikely that a network should have a
clustering coeﬃcient of one. It is, however, not unlikely that economic and
social networks should have clustering coeﬃcients that are near to one
(D. Watts 1999 and references therein) or have a tendency to converge to
one (Granovetter 1973). While deÞnitive results seem unlikely, Theorem 1
is suggestive that play will converge to an imitation equilibrium when the
reference network has a clustering coeﬃcient that is close to one. Future
work hopes to address this issue.
4 Adding innovation
In the previous section we looked in some detail at the long run convergence
properties of the imitation with innovation dynamic on the assumption that
players solely use imitation. We have provided conditions for which the dy-
namic converges on an imitation equilibrium. It should be apparent that an
imitation equilibrium need not be a Nash equilibrium. Indeed a player may
be able to signiÞcantly improve her payoﬀ by selecting a diﬀerent strategy
than that consistent with an imitation equilibrium. This provides ample
motivation for a player to use an innovation heuristic. We now turn to con-
sider what happens when players use such a heuristic. Let us begin with
two deÞnitions,
Nash ε-Equilibrium: The strategy vector σ is a Nash ε-equilibrium of
stage game Γ if
ui(s
k, σ−i) ≤ ui(σ) + ε
for all i ∈ N and for all sk ∈ S.
Nash, Imitation ε-Equilibrium: The strategy vector σ a Nash, Imita-
tion ε-Equilibrium of stage game Γ relative to reference network R if
σ is both a Nash ε-equilibrium and an imitation equilibrium relative
to R.
We refer to a Nash, imitation 0-equilibrium as a Nash, imitation equi-
librium and a Nash 0-equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium. These deÞnitions
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should need no explanation and lead to the following result which we state
without proof,
Lemma 2: A state σ is an absorbing state of the imitation with in-
novation dynamic I(ε;λ = 1;R) if and only if it is a Nash ε-equilibrium.
A state σ is an absorbing state of the imitation with innovation dynamic
I(ε;λ 6= 0, 1;R) if and only if it is a Nash, imitation ε-equilibrium.
There is an extensive literature on the convergence, and non-convergence,
of best response dynamics (See Fudenberg and Levine 1998 and references
therein). Thus, given the similarities between best response and innovation,
we do not look speciÞcally at the at the case where λ = 1. It is, however,
interesting to look at the interaction between innovation and imitation. We
illustrate with three examples. In each example we evaluate whether or
not the imitation with innovation dynamic converges on an absorbing state
for the three possibilities of λ = 1 (innovation), λ = 0 (imitation) and
λ 6= 0, 1 (imitation with innovation). The results of these examples can be
summarized by the following table,10
Example innovation Imitation innovation and imitation
3 converges converges need not converge
4 need not converge converges converges
5 need not converge need not converge converges
Before discussing any conclusions let us set out the examples where we
assume throughout that ε = 0.
Example 3: There are two players and three strategies A,B and C.
Both players refer to each other. The payoﬀ matrix is as follows where
player 1 chooses a row and player 2 a column,11
A B C
A 3, 1 3, 2 0, 0
B 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
C 0, 0 0, 0 10, 10
10Examples can easily be derived to illustrate the other Þve possible combinations of
convergence in the three dynamics.
11The Þrst entry in the payoﬀ matrix is that of the row player and the second that of
the column player.
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Strategy vector (C,C) is the unique Nash, imitation equilibrium. Suppose,
however, that the current state is (A,A). This is not a Nash equilibrium
as player 2 may innovate and choose strategy B. Strategy vector (A,B) is
not an imitation equilibrium as player 2 may imitate and choose strategy A.
Thus, if λ 6= 0, 1 the imitation with innovation dynamic need not converge
on an absorbing state. It is easily checked, however, that if λ = 0 or if
λ = 1 the imitation with innovation dynamic does converge on an absorbing
state.¨
Example 4: There are two players and four strategies A,B,C and
D. Both players refer to each other. The game can be represented by the
following payoﬀ matrix.
A B C D
A 1, 0 0, 0 0, 1 0, 0
B 0, 1 0, 0 1, 0 0, 0
C 0, 0 10, 10 0, 0 0, 0
D 0, 0 20, 0 0, 0 100, 100
There exists a unique Nash, imitation equilibrium (D,D). If λ = 1 the
imitation with innovation dynamic need not converge on a Nash equilibria.
Suppose for example the current state is (A,A). Play may evolve through
the cycle of states (A,C) → (B,C) → (B,A) → (A,A). By contrast, the
imitation with innovation dynamic will clearly converge on an imitation
equilibrium if λ = 0. Similarly, the imitation with innovation dynamic
converges almost surely to a Nash, imitation equilibria if λ 6= 0, 1 . This is
apparent after considering what may happen if the current state is (A,C);
player 1 may imitate player 2, implying play evolves to state (C,C); at this
point, player 1 may imitate and player 2 may use innovation in which case
play evolves to state (C,B) and ultimately (D,D).¨
Example 5: There are four players and four strategies A,B,C and
D. The reference network is such that R1 = {1, 2}, R2 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, R3 =
{1, 2, 3, 4} and R4 = {3, 4}. Play revolves around the following matrix game,
A B C D
A 4, 0 0, 0 3, 4 0, 0
B 0, 1 0, 0 4, 0 0, 0
C 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
D 0, 0 20, 0 0, 0 100, 100
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Players 1 and 2 choose a row and players 3 and 4 choose a column. There are
then four plays of the above matrix game as player 1 plays the matrix game
against both players 3 and 4 and player 2 plays the matrix game against both
players 3 and 4. Thus, if the strategy vector is (A,A,A,C) the payoﬀ vector
is (7, 7, 0, 8) while if the strategy vector is (A,C,C,C) the payoﬀ vector is
(6, 0, 4, 4).
If λ = 1 the imitation with innovation dynamic need not converge on a
Nash equilibria; as in Example 4, if neither player 1 or 2 is playing strategy
C or D and neither player 3 or 4 is playing strategy B or D then play
cannot evolve to the unique Nash equilibrium (D,D,D,D). Similarly, if
λ = 0 the imitation with innovation dynamic need also not converge on an
absorbing state; there exists a cycle of states (A,A,A,C)→ (A,C,C,C)→
(A,A,A,C).
If λ 6= 0, 1 then the imitation with innovation dynamic does converge
to a Nash, imitation equilibrium. To appreciate this assume an initial state
(B,B,C,C). All players may use the imitation heuristic in the subsequent
two periods leading to state (B,B,B,C) and then (B,B,B,B). If players
1 and 2 use the innovation heuristic and players 3 and 4 use the imitation
heuristic then play may evolve to (D,D,B,B) and ultimately the unique
Nash, imitation equilibrium (D,D,D,D).¨
In discussion perhaps the most interesting point to note is how the com-
bination of imitation with innovation can imply convergence on a Nash equi-
librium when the use of imitation or innovation in isolation do not imply
such convergence. In particular, in both examples 4 and 5 there are Nash
equilibria that seem to be appropriate long run outcomes but to which the
imitation with innovation dynamic need not converge if players solely use
the innovation heuristic.12 These examples illustrate how imitation may
help players to learn to play a Nash equilibria. We discuss this possibility
in more detail in the next section and in the conclusion. Another interesting
point illustrated, in particular by example 3, is how, even if play converges,
when players use innovation, it may not converge to a state that is stable
under an imitation dynamic. This is signiÞcant if players do have desires
for fair outcomes in which they are treated equally with those players to
whom they refer.
12We note that examples 4 and 5 are fairly robust to changes in the innovation and
imitation heuristics. For example, the conclusions are unaltered if there is a positive
probability that a player will play the same strategy as in the previous period.
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5 Large games and convergence
In this section we look to provide suﬃcient conditions for the imitation
with innovation dynamic to converge on an approximate Nash, imitation
equilibrium. In doing so we impose conditions on both the stage game being
played and on the reference network. The notion of a pregame satisfying
a large game property, as introduced and deÞned by Wooders, Cartwright
and Selten (2001), will be used.
5.1 Pregames
A pregame is given by a triple (Ω, S, h) consisting of a compact metric space
of player attributes Ω, a Þnite strategy set S and a function h : Ω×S×W →
R where W is a set of weight functions. A function w from Ω× S into R is
said to be a weight function if it satisÞes
P
sk∈S w(ω, s
k) ∈ Z for all ω ∈ Ω.
Let N be a Þnite set and let α be a mapping from N to Ω, called an
attribute function. The pair (N,α) is a population. We say that a weight
function wα corresponds to population (N,α) when it satisÞesX
sk∈S
wα(ω, s
k) =
¯¯
α−1(ω)
¯¯
for all ω ∈ Ω. We letWα denote the set of weight functions corresponding to
the population (N,α). Given a population (N,α) and a strategy vector σ we
say that weight function wα,σ is relative to strategy vector σ and attribute
function α if,
wα,σ(ω, s
k) =
X
i∈N : α(i)=ω and σi=sk
1
for all sk ∈ S and all ω ∈ Ω. Thus, wα,σ(ω, sk) denotes the number of
players of attribute ω (as determined by α) who are playing strategy sk (as
determined by σ).
Given population (N,α) and player i ∈ N , deÞne α−i as the restriction
of α to N\{i}. Let wα−i,σ be a weight function deÞned by its components
as follows
wα−i,σ(ω, s
k) =
½
wα,σ(ω, s
k)− 1 if α(i) = ω and σi = sk
wα,σ(ω, s
k) otherwise.
for all ω ∈ Ω and for all sk ∈ S. We will use Wα−ω to denote the set of
weight functions corresponding to population (N\{i}, α−i) where ω = α(i).
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Given a population (N,α), a game
Γ(N,α) = ((N,α), S, {hω : S ×Wα−ω −→ R|ω ∈ α(N)})
is induced from the pregame (Ω, S, h) by deÞning, for each ω ∈ α(N),
hω(t, w) = h(ω, t, w)
for all t ∈ S and all w ∈ Wα−ω. In interpretation, hα(i)(t, w) is the payoﬀ
received by a player i ∈ N of attribute α(i) from playing the strategy t when
the strategies of other players are summarized by w. Note that players of the
same attribute have the same payoﬀ function, inherited from the pregame. A
players payoﬀ function is thus indexed by their attribute type - a departure
from the notation used in the Þrst half of the paper.
We should perhaps highlight how in this section we have changed from
considering one game in isolation to considering a set or family of games.
This family of games is determined by the pregame. We focus on pregames
that satisfy a large game property.
5.2 Large games
A pregame satisÞes the large game property if it satisÞes both continuity of
payoﬀ functions in attributes and global interaction.
Continuity of payoﬀ functions: The pregame G = (Ω, S, h) satisÞes
continuity of payoﬀ functions in attributes if for any ε > 0 there exists
real numbers ηc(ε) and δc(ε) > 0 such that for any two games Γ(N,α)
and Γ(N,α) where |N | > ηc(ε), if, for all i ∈ N ,
dist(α(i), α(i)) < δc(ε)
then, for any i ∈ N and for any strategy vector σ,¯¯¯
hα(i)(s
k, wα−i,σ)− hα(i)(sk, wα−i,σ)
¯¯¯
< ε
for all sk ∈ S, where wα,σ and wα,σ are the weight functions relative
to strategy vector σ and, respectively, attribute functions α and α.
Global interaction: The pregame G = (Ω, S, h) satisÞes global interaction
if for any ε > 0 there exists real numbers ηg(ε) and δg(ε) > 0 such
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that for any game Γ(N,α) where |N | > ηg(ε) and for any two weight
functions wα and gα, both relative to attribute function α, if,
1
|N |
X
sk∈S
X
ω∈α(N)
¯¯¯
wα(ω, s
k)− gα(ω, sk)
¯¯¯
< δg(ε)
then, ¯¯¯
hα(i)(s
k, wα−i)− hα(i)(sk, gα−i)
¯¯¯
< ε (1)
for all i ∈ N and all sk ∈ S.
We denote by G(ηc, δc, ηg, δg) a pregame that satisÞes continuity of payoﬀ
functions as demonstrated by functions ηc and δc and satisÞes global inter-
action as demonstrated by functions ηg and δg where ηc, δc, ηg and δg map
R+ into R+. A pregame G(ηc, δc, ηg, δg) satisÞes the large game property.
The notion of a pregame satisfying the large game property is discussed
in some detail by Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2001). Here we provide a
brief summary. The deÞnition of continuity of payoﬀ functions in attributes
compares two populations in which the attributes of players are slightly per-
turbed. As such, two diﬀerent games Γ(N,α) and Γ(N,α) are compared.
Continuity of payoﬀ functions in attributes requires that a players payoﬀ
function should be approximately the same in both games. A global in-
teraction assumption suggests that a players payoﬀ is a function primarily
of the number of people of each attribute playing each strategy, relative to
the total population. As such, a players payoﬀ is largely dependent on the
proportions of players of each attribute type playing each strategy (and, of
course, on their own strategy choice).
Our interest in large game property is motivated by two considerations.
First, an existing result from Wooders et al. (2001) states that if the large
game property holds, plus certain other mild assumptions, then for suﬃ-
ciently large populations there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium σ
that partitions the population into a relatively small number of societies;
players belonging to the same society play the same strategy and have similar
attributes. To see the importance of this result it must Þrst be appreciated
that in general a game will not have an approximate Nash, imitation equilib-
rium. Indeed the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium is, generally
speaking, unlikely.13 The result due to Wooders et al (2001) suggests that a
Nash, imitation equilibrium may exist for large games. A second motivation
13Remember that players choose pure strategies and so we are questioning the existence
of an Nash ε-equilibrium in pure strategies.
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for introducing the large game property is how it appears to capture the
type of games for which the modelled behavior appears most appropriate.
In particular, in large games both imitation and innovation appear sensible
decision making heuristics. A large player set, for instance, makes imitation
seem appropriate given the greater potential to learn from the experience of
others. Also, a large player set suggests that predicting the actions of others
may be diﬃcult and thus innovation (based on a ceteris paribus assumption)
appears appropriate.
The imitation with innovation dynamic need not converge to an approx-
imate Nash, imitation equilibrium in large games. We illustrate with the
following example.
Example 6: The attribute space is given by Ω = {R,C}. There are
two strategies A and B. Payoﬀs are calculated according to the following
matrix game M ,
A B
A 1, 0 0, 1
B 0, 1 1, 0
In interpretation, a player with attribute R chooses a row in game M and
a player with attribute C chooses a column. For any population (N,α) the
game Γ(N,α) is such that every player of attribute R is matched to play
game M against every player of attribute C; a player must play the same
strategy (of game M) against all opponents. The payoﬀ of a player equals
his total accumulated payoﬀ from playing game M divided by |N |, the size
of the population. Depending on the level of ε there exists a set of Nash,
imitation equilibria in which approximately half of the players of attribute
C choose strategy A and in which half of the players with attribute R choose
strategy A. This pregame satisÞes the large game property.
If players only refer to players of the same attribute then the imitation
with innovation dynamic need not converge on an absorbing state for games
induced from this pregame (for small ε). Two remarks help illustrate this.
First, if λ = 1 (i.e. just innovation) the imitation with innovation dynamic
will not converge on a Nash ε equilibrium unless play commences at one.14
This is a familiar result. Second, stated informally, in this game the imitation
heuristic and innovation heuristic are essentially equivalent. In particular,
14Except for a few trivial games that could be induced from this pregame - every player
having attribute C, for example.
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if the imitation with innovation dynamic does not converge on an absorbing
state when λ = 1 then it will not if λ 6= 0, 1.¨
5.3 Coordination games and large game reference networks
We provide suﬃcient conditions on both the game and reference network to
guarantee the convergence of the imitation with innovation dynamic on an
absorbing state. We begin by deÞning the concept of a coordination game
and below deÞne large game reference networks.
For any two strategy proÞles σ, σ let X(σ, σ) ⊂ N be those players j ∈ N
such that σj 6= σj .
Coordination game: Given a pregame G, the game Γ(N,α) is a coordi-
nation game with bound L when for any two strategy proÞles σ, σ if,
|X(σ, σ)| ≥ L and,
hα(i)(σi, wα−i,σ) > hα(i)(σi, wα−i,σ)
for all i ∈ X(σ, σ) then,X
i∈N
hα(i)(σi, wα−i,σ) >
X
i∈N
hα(i)(σi, wα−i,σ).
Let CG(L) denote the set of coordination games with bound L that can be
induced from pregame G. A coordination game with bound L has the prop-
erty that when more than L players change strategy and each player who
changes strategy gets a payoﬀ increase then the total payoﬀ of the popula-
tion increases. We note that any game Γ(N,α) belongs to set CG(|N |).
It appears relatively mild to assume that a game induced from a pregame
satisfying the large game property should be a coordination game. In par-
ticular the nature of a large game is that a players actions will typically
inßuence their own payoﬀ much more than the payoﬀs of others. Thus, if
a player changes strategy to his own beneÞt it appears relatively mild to
assume that the total payoﬀ of the population increases. We note, however,
that in a game with many players small individual losses can accumulate
to big population wide losses. Reßecting this, a game may not be a coor-
dination game with bound L for small L; examples include n-Þrm Cournot
quantity setting competition and n-player Prisoners Dilemma. The larger is
L, however, the more likely it should be that a game is a coordination game
with bound L.15 We note that games induced from the pregame of Example
15Note if Γ(N,α) ∈ CG(L) then Γ(N,α) ∈ CG(L∗) for any L∗ > L.
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6 are not coordination games with bound L for any L < N ; in these games
the total payoﬀ of the population is Þxed independently of the strategies of
the players; thus, one players gain is another players loss.
We turn our attention to reference networks. In games induced from a
pregame it seems intuitive that a players reference group should be deter-
mined by his attribute and by the attribute function. Given a pregame G
a reference network function RN is a function mapping attribute functions
to reference networks. In interpretation, RN(α) is the reference network of
population (N,α). We deÞne a particular form of reference network after
introducing some notation. Given the population (N,α) and player i ∈ N
we denote by Bi(δ)α the subset of player set N such that player j ∈ Bi(δ)α
if and only if dist(α(i), α(j)) ≤ δ. That is, if we draw a ball in attribute
space around α(i) of diameter δ then Bi(δ)α is those players within the ball.
Large game reference networks: Given a pregame G and reference net-
work function RN the reference network RN(α) ≡ R is a large game
reference network with bounds L,U and δ if
1. R is symmetric16 and has a clustering coeﬃcient of one,
2. Ri ⊂ Bi(δ)α for all i ∈ N , and,
3. L ≤ |Ri| ≤ U for all i ∈ N .
We denote by LR(L,U, δ) the set of large game reference networks with
bounds L,U and δ.
Behind the concept of a large game reference network are three reÞne-
ments on reference networks studied in Section 3. First, there is an upper
and lower bound on the size of a players reference group as given by U
and L. Second, players only refer to those players with similar attributes
to themselves where δ measures the similarity. Third, the reference net-
work is symmetric. These three reÞnements seem relatively mild but the
implications are worth exploring a little further.
Symmetry is a common simplifying assumption in modelling social net-
works (e.g. Jackson andWolinsky 1996 and D. Watts 1999). It can, however,
be a strong assumption; in markets, for example, small Þrms may refer to
big Þrms but big Þrms not refer to small Þrms. The assumption of symme-
try can be weakened and the conclusions of Theorem 2 still hold but this
comes at the cost of signiÞcantly complicating the analysis; a requirement
that reference networks be predominantly symmetric is still required.
16That is, if i ∈ Rj then j ∈ Ri for all i, j ∈ N .
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The assumption that a player refers to those with similar attributes to
herself is intuitively appealing. If, however, a player has an attribute that
is relatively scarce then this implies she must refer to relatively few people.
For this to be reasonable would seem to require that a player has a speciÞc
preference for referring to players with similar attributes to herself; that is,
to be willing to trade referring to relatively few players in order to refer only
to those players who are similar to herself. We note how the above remarks
demonstrate that the possible values of δ and L are not independent.
5.4 Main result
We have now introduced all the necessary concepts to state our second result.
A sketch proof and discussion is provided in Section 5.6.
Theorem 2: Let G(ηc, δc, ηg, δg) be any pregame satisfying the large
game property and RN any reference network function. Given any ε > 0 and
any real number U there exists real numbers η2(ε, U) and δ2(ε, U) ≥ δc
¡
ε
3
¢
such that for any population (N,α) where |N | > η2(ε, U) if Γ(N,α) ∈
CG(L) and RN(α) ∈ LR (L,U, δ2(ε, U)), for some L, then the imitation
with innovation dynamic I(ε;λ 6= 0, 1;R) almost surely converges to a Nash,
imitation ε-equilibrium.17
Proof: Suppose that the statement of the Theorem is false. Then
there exists some ε > 0 and some U such that, for each integer ν there
is a population (Nν , αν) where |Nν | > ν, where Γ(Nν , αν) ∈ CG(Lν) and
RN(αν) ∈ LR ¡Lν , U, δc ¡ ε3¢¢ for some Lν , and for which there exists a non-
singleton communication class of the imitation with innovation dynamic
(λ 6= 0, 1). Let δ = δc
¡
ε
3
¢
and let Rν = RN(αν) for all ν.
From the proof of Theorem 1 it is immediate that the population (Nν , αν),
for any ν, can be partitioned into a set of cliques. That is, the player set Nν
can be partitioned into subsets cν1, ..., c
ν
Qν with the property, for all i ∈ Nν ,
that if i ∈ cνq then Rνi = cνq .
For any game Γ(Nν , αν) and any initial state σ suppose that play evolves
according to the following process,
1. all players i ∈ Nν use the imitation heuristic, and imitate any success
example, until the process evolves to an imitation equilibrium.
17 It is apparent from the proof that the statement δ2(ε, U) ≥ δc
¡
ε
3
¢
can be relaxed to
δ2(ε, U) ≥ δc (∗) where ∗ > ε2 is arbitrarily close to ε2 .
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2. in the following period a unique player i ∈ Nν uses the innovation
heuristic and chooses an innovation opportunity. All other players use
the imitation heuristic.
3. the process returns to stage 1 and repeats.
Fix a value for ν and consider the evolution of play. By Theorem 1
play will, almost surely, converge to an imitation equilibrium σ during the
Þrst stage of the process. For each clique cνq there must exist some strategy
sνq ∈ S such that σi = sνq for all i ∈ cνq . That is, any two players in the
same clique play the same strategy.
If a contradiction is to be avoided there must exist some player iν ∈ Nν
who has an innovation opportunity given strategy vector σ. Suppose, that
in stage 2 of the process player iν chooses strategy sk. This implies that
strategy vector σ is observed in the next period (say period t) where σj = σj
for all j ∈ Nν\{iν} and hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ) > hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ) + ε.
In period t + 1, all players use the imitation heuristic. We note that if
iν ∈ cνq then no player l ∈ cνq where cνq 6= cνq can have a success example
who is not a costrategist. Thus, if strategy vector σ is observed σl = σl for
all l ∈ Nν\cνq . Given the value of δ and continuity of payoﬀ functions, for
suﬃciently large ν and for any j ∈ cνq ,¯¯¯
hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ)− hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ)
¯¯¯
<
ε
3
.
By the assumption of global interaction, for suﬃciently large ν and for any
player j 6= iν , ¯¯¯
hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ)− hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ)
¯¯¯
<
ε
3
.
Thus,
hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ) > hαν(j)(σj , wα
ν
−j ,σ) + ε
−
¯¯¯
hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ)− hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ)
¯¯¯
−
¯¯¯
hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ)− hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ)
¯¯¯
> hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ) +
ε
3
> hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ).
for all j ∈ cνq\{iν}. This implies that player iν is the unique success example
for those players j ∈ cνq\{iν}. Note that player iν will be their own and only
success example. Thus, σj = σiν for all j ∈ cνq .
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Given the assumption of global interaction and the fact that U is inde-
pendent of ν, for suﬃciently large ν¯¯¯
hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ
)− hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ)
¯¯¯
<
ε
3
. (2)
This implies that
hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ
) > hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ) +
2
3
ε.
The choice of δ and continuity of payoﬀ functions implies that for suﬃciently
large ν ¯¯¯
hαν(j)(σj , wα−j ,σ)− hαν(iν)(σiν , wα−iν ,σ)
¯¯¯
<
ε
3
for all j ∈ cνq . Thus,
hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ
) > hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ) +
2
3
ε (3)
−
¯¯¯
hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ
)− hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ)
¯¯¯
−
¯¯¯
hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ)− hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ)
¯¯¯
> hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ)
for all j ∈ cνq .
Compare strategy vectors σν and σν . We note that X(σν , σν) = cνq .
It is immediate from (3), given that Γ(Nν , αν) ∈ CG(Lν) and RN(αν) ∈
LR ¡Lν , U, δc ¡ ε3¢¢, that, for suﬃciently large νX
j∈Nν
hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ
) >
X
j∈Nν
hαν(j)(σj , wαν−j ,σ).
Thus, as play evolves repeatedly as above the total payoﬀ of the population
increases and never decreases. Given that the state space is Þnite this gives
the desired contradiction.¥
Theorem 2 demonstrates that for a broad class of games with many
players the imitation with innovation dynamic almost surely converges on
an approximate Nash, imitation equilibrium. A corollary of Theorem 2
(and of Theorem 3 to follow) is that there must exist an approximate Nash,
imitation equilibrium in suﬃciently large coordination games induced from
a pregame satisfying the large game property. This complements a result
due to Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2001). They demonstrate that all
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suﬃciently large games induced from a pregame satisfying the large game
property have an approximate Nash, imitation equilibrium provided there
is a bound, independent of population size, on the number of players of
each attribute. We require no such restriction on the dispersal of players in
attribute space.18 Before discussing Theorem 2 in more detail we provide a
complementary result.
5.5 Bounding the number of societies
DeÞne a society as a group of players who (1) refer to, and only to, all
other members of the society and (2) play the same strategy. The bound on
reference group size in Theorem 2, as given by U , implies that the number
of societies in any approximate Nash, imitation equilibrium, will grow arbi-
trarily large as the size of the population increases. A principle motivation
of Wooders et. al. (2001) was to demonstrate the existence of a Nash equi-
librium that partitioned the player set into a bounded number of societies
where the bound is independent of population size. Thus, as the population
size increases societies become arbitrarily large.
We oﬀer a complementary result to that of Theorem 2 in which the
number of societies can be bounded independently of the population size.
Before doing so we reÞne the notion of a coordination game.
Coordination game: Given a pregame G, the game Γ(N,α) is a coordi-
nation game with bounds L and δ if Γ(N,α) is a coordination game
with bound L and if for any player i ∈ N , any strategy sk ∈ S and
any two weight functions wα and gα, ifX
ω∈Bi(δ)α
wα(ω, s
k) >
X
ω∈Bi(δ)α
gα(ω, s
k)
and wα(ω, sk) = gα(ω, sk) for all ω /∈ Bi(δ)α then
hα(i)(s
k, wα−i) ≥ hα(i)(sk, gα−i).
We denote by CG(L, δ) the set of coordination games with bound L and δ.
A coordination game with bounds L and δ has the additional property
(over a coordination game with bound L) that a player gets a higher payoﬀ
18Note that a Nash equilibrium need not exist in coordination games even for large
populations. Consider, for example a population of players matched to play a two strategy,
oﬀ diagonal coordination game. The unique Nash equilibrium is half the population play
one strategy and the other half play the other strategy. There can only exist a Nash
equilibrium when there are an even number of players.
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when there are more players with similar attributes to himself who are
playing the same strategy as himself. This seems an intuitively plausible
characteristic of a coordination game.
We state our third main result.
Theorem 3: Let G(ηc, δc, ηg, δg) be any pregame satisfying the large
game property and let RN be any large game reference network function.
Given any ε > 0 there exists real numbers η3(ε) and δ3(ε) ≥ δc
¡
ε
3
¢
such that
for any population (N,α) where |N | > η3(ε) if Γ(N,α) ∈ CG (L, δ3(ε)) and
RN(α) ∈ LR (L, |N | , δ3(ε)), for some L, then the imitation with innovation
dynamic I(ε;λ 6= 0, 1;R) almost surely converges to a Nash, imitation ε-
equilibrium.
Proof: A proof proceeds in an almost identical fashion to that of Theo-
rem 2. It is only with respect to (2) that we observe any signiÞcant diﬀerence.
This changes to
hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ
) ≥ hαν(iν)(σiν , wαν−iν ,σ)
as implied by the fact Γ(N,α) ∈ CG ¡L, δc ¡ ε3¢¢.¥
The convergence result of Theorem 3 is not dependent upon each player
referring to a bounded number of players. Thus, the number of societies
need not grow large as the size of the population grows large. Indeed sup-
pose there exists a reference network where every player refers to every
other player in the population and where every player in the population is
approximately similar; Theorem 3 could be applied to show the existence
of an approximate Nash, imitation equilibrium where every player in the
population plays the same strategy.
5.6 Discussion
A sketch of the proof of Theorem 2 (and Theorem 3) provides some intuition
and allows us to highlight some additional issues. A simple example is also
provided.
Take as given a population (N,α). DeÞne a clique C as a subset of player
set N with the property that every player i ∈ C refers to, and only to, the
clique, thus Ri = C for all i ∈ C. Suppose that RN(α) ∈ LR (L,U, δ)
for some L. This implies that the reference network RN(α) will have the
property that the player set can be partitioned into a set of cliques C1, ..., CQ,
where each clique is of size L or greater. In the long run, given that players
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imitate, it is to be expected that players in the same clique will play the
same strategy. Thus, assume, for the moment, that players in the same
clique always play the same strategy. Further suppose that a clique only
changes strategy if doing so would, ceteris paribus, increase the payoﬀ of
each member of the clique. Finally, assume that only one clique at a time
changes strategy. If the game Γ(N,α) ∈ CG(L) then it is clear, if play
evolves as above, that the per-capita payoﬀ will increase and never decrease.
Play must therefore evolve to an absorbing state and thus an approximate
Nash, imitation equilibrium. We highlight that cliques are clearly related to
societies as deÞned in Section 5.5.19
In sketching the proof of Theorems 2 and 3 it remains for us to argue
why cliques could be seen as behaving in the way outlined in the previous
paragraph. Consider a clique C and a period t where every player i ∈ C is
playing some strategy A. We note that all members of the clique C receive
approximately the same payoﬀ (because they have similar attributes). For
the purposes of this explanation assume that they all receive the same payoﬀ.
Suppose that a player i ∈ C uses the innovation heuristic, has an innovation
opportunity of strategy B, and therefore chooses strategy B in period t+1.
Ceteris paribus, the payoﬀ of player i increases by at least ε. Provided
that the population is suﬃciently large (and thus the inßuence of player i is
suﬃciently small) player i will be a success example to all members of the
clique C in period t+ 1. Thus, if all members of clique C use the imitation
heuristic they will all choose strategy B in period t+ 2. Assume again, for
simplicity, that in period t + 2 all members of clique C receive the same
payoﬀ. Provided that the payoﬀ of player i is higher in period t + 2 than
in period t then the payoﬀ of every player j ∈ C is higher in period t than
in period t + 2. If this is the case then we have illustrated how play may
evolve as outlined in the previous paragraph. This will be the case if clique
C is suﬃciently small or if the game is a coordination game with bounds
L and δ for some appropriate value of δ.
An important element in the proof of our main theorems, as sketched
above, is how players appear to act collectively, within their cliques, even
if they are not aware of doing so. This collective action stems from the
imitation. By acting within cliques, and thus in groups of size L or more,
players are able to realize the gains suggested by a game Γ(N,α) being
a coordination game with bound L. Without imitation players may not
be able to realize any such gains. We note, for example, that if L > 1
19Note, however, that cliques are deÞned with respect to a reference network while
societies are primarily deÞned with respect to a strategy vector.
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and players learn by innovation then, because each player acts unilaterally
(both directly and indirectly), the potential gains from group action my
not be realized.20 We see, therefore, that imitation has a crucial role to play
in the learning dynamic. Innovation, however, plays an equally important
role in enabling cliques to search for more eﬃcient strategies. This results
from each individual within a clique looking for innovation opportunities.
It is worth noting that it need not be enough for one person with a clique
to innovate while all others imitate; players within a clique are similar,
but are also suﬃciently diﬀerent that one player could have an innovation
opportunity that another does not.
The above discussion suggests that innovation and imitation complement
each other to enable learning of an approximate Nash, imitation equilibrium.
This leads us to question the role of imitation and, in particular, whether
imitation can help players to learn to play an approximate Nash equilib-
rium. We look at this issue in more detail. There are broadly two viewpoints
that could be taken with respect to imitation. First, we could take the view
that individuals imitate because of some inherited behavior and imitation
may be of no beneÞt to an individual. If we take this viewpoint the task
is to question whether imitation gets in the way of individual learning.
In particular, can imitation (or conformity) be consistent with individually
rational behavior. This could be seen as the viewpoint taken by Bernheim
(1994) and Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2001). A second viewpoint
is to say that individuals imitate because they derive some speciÞc beneÞt
from doing so. This viewpoint would lead us to ask whether imitation can
help learning. This could be seen as the viewpoint taken by Schlag (1999).
We consider each viewpoint in turn.
Theorems 2 and 3 suggest that in large coordination games imitation can
be consistent with individual rationality. This is demonstrated by the fact
that individuals imitate and yet approximate Nash equilibrium play emerges.
The proof of Theorem 2 allows us to be a little more speciÞc. In particular, if
play evolves as set out in the proof of Theorem 2 and as outlined above then,
as discussed, any player who imitates will increase her payoﬀ. This clearly
suggests that imitation can be consistent with individual rationality. We
note however that this argument, for the individual rationality of imitation,
relies crucially on the fact that each player only imitates those with similar
attributes to himself. If this is not the case then the individual rationality
20 If a game Γ(N,α) ∈ CG(1) then an innovation dynamic (with inertia) I(ε;λ = 1;R)
will converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium. This is a trivial result. If, however,
Γ(N,α) /∈ CG(1) then there is no guarantee that an innovation dynamic need converge to
an approximate Nash equilibrium.
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of imitation is called into question.
Let us now consider whether imitation can help learning. At Þrst this
may seem unlikely given the proceeding discussion. In particular, if a player
who imitates increases his payoﬀ then imitation may appear to be a form
of innovation. This, however, is not the case for two reasons. First, a
player, through imitation, can realize individual gains of less than ε. That
is, a player may be motivated to change strategy through imitation when
no innovation opportunity exists. This suggests that we could just set ε
to be zero. Note, however, that if ε = 0 there need not exist a Nash ε-
equilibrium and thus play may fail to converge to a Nash ε-equilibrium.
Second, imitation suggests a dynamic in which players within the same clique
play the same strategy. This allows the clique to behave as a group and
realize the gains suggested by a game being a coordination game with bound
L. If players innovate then diﬀerent players may have diﬀerent, and many,
innovation opportunities. Thus, players within the same clique may end up
playing diﬀerent strategies. This lack of coordination suggests that players
may fail to realize the gains suggested by a game being a coordination game
with bound L. The potential for imitation to help  learning is discussed
further in the conclusion.
We Þnish this section with a simple example that may help to illustrate
some of the discussion. We discuss potential applications of the imitation
with innovation dynamic in the conclusion.
Example 7: The strategy space is given by S = {1, 2, 3} and the at-
tribute space by Ω = [0, 3]3. Given attribute ω = (ω1, ω2, ω3) the value of
ωk could be thought of as a players preference for strategy k. For any pop-
ulation (N,α) and any weight function w ∈ Wα let yw : S → R be deÞned
by
yw[k] =
X
ω∈support(α)
w(ω, k)
for all k ∈ S. The value yw[k] is thus total number of players playing strategy
k. For any population (N,α) and any player i ∈ N the payoﬀ function of
player i is given by21
hα(i)(k,w) =
1
|N | [ωkyw[k − 1] + k(yw[k] + 1)]
for all k ∈ S and w ∈ Wα−ω where α(i) = ω = (ω1, ω2, ω3). We note that
if all players i ∈ N play strategy k then each player receives a payoﬀ of k.
21 If k = 1 then set yw[0] = 0.
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Thus, for most games the Nash equilibrium (3, 3, ...., 3) will be the Pareto
optimum. It is easily checked that this pregame satisÞes the large game
property.22
In the context of Theorem 3 it is possible to set δ3(ε) = 2 and η3(ε) = 1
for any ε > 0. We will, however, consider just one speciÞc population (N,α).
Let |N | = 300 and suppose player 1 has attribute ω1 = (0, 2, 0), player 2 has
attribute ω2 = (0, 0, 3) and players 3, 4, ..., 300 have attribute ω0 = (0, 0, 0).
Further, assume the reference network is such that Ri = N for all i ∈ N .
Suppose that ε = 0.
Assume an initial state (1, 1, ..., 1). Each player receives a payoﬀ of 1.
Player 1 can increase his payoﬀ to 2 by playing strategy 2 while any other
player switching to strategy 2 would see her payoﬀ fall to 2300 . Play will
thus evolve to strategy vector (2, 1, 1, ..., 1) whereby player 1 becomes a
success example to all players. If players use the imitation heuristic then
play may thus evolve to strategy vector (2, 2, ..., 2). Note that the transition
from strategy vector (2, 1, 1, ..., 1) to (2, 2, ..., 2) may come in one step or
through a gradual process. Given strategy vector (2, 2, ..., 2) player 2 has
an innovation opportunity - he can improve his payoﬀ by playing strategy
3. Play may thus evolve to strategy vector (2, 3, 2, ..., 2) and then onto
(3, 3, ..., 3). In reality the evolution of play may not be as neat as above in
the sense that player 3 may take an innovation opportunity and play strategy
3 while some players are still playing strategy 1. That the imitation with
innovation dynamic dynamic will converge to the Pareto optimum state
(3, 3, ..., 3) is, however, not in doubt. In this example we clearly see the
process of innovation and imitation that was outlined above. We can also
look at the role played by imitation by assuming that players do not imitate.
We note that strategy vector (2, 1, 1, ..., 1) is a Nash equilibrium. Thus,
if players do not imitate and play commences with state (1, 1, ..., 1) the
innovation dynamic I(ε = 0;λ = 1;R) will converge to state (2, 1, 1, ..., 1)
and not to the Pareto optimal state.
6 Conclusion
This paper has provided suﬃcient conditions under which a population of
boundedly rational individuals will learn to play an approximate Nash equi-
libria. Indeed, we go further by showing that aggregate play converges
towards an approximate Nash, imitation equilibrium in pure strategies. We
focussed on learning in coordination games with many players and learning
22A suitable metric on Ω is dist(ω, ω) = maxk |ωk − ωk|.
35
through imitation with innovation. We demonstrated that the convergence
of an imitation with innovation dynamic is dependent on the reference net-
work through which players refer to each other; if the reference network
has a clustering coeﬃcient of one and if each player refers to players similar
to himself then convergence is more likely. Our main results suggest that
imitation can be consistent with individually rational behavior. Through
example we demonstrate that imitation may even aid learning in the sense
that players learn to play a more eﬃcient strategy vector, when using both
imitation and innovation, than they do when just using innovation.
Two potential applications of these results appear to be in modelling
market interaction and technological or scientiÞc evolution. In terms of
technological and scientiÞc evolution the notion of learning through imita-
tion and innovation is a natural one (see, for example Kuhn 1996 and Ziman
2000). The imitation with innovation dynamic may also be appropriate for
modelling market interaction; consumers and producers are involved in an
adaptive process of choosing products to buy and sell and deciding what
prices to pay or accept. Adaption in Cournot like market interaction games
has been the subject of a number of related papers (e.g. Vega-Redondo 1997,
Alos-Ferrer, Ania and Schenk-Hoppe 2000, Selten and Ostmann 2000, Sel-
ten and Apesteguia 2002). To apply the imitation with innovation dynamic
in studying such learning processes remains a goal for future research.
The notion that imitation can aid learning is another avenue we feel is
worth exploring further. After all, if individuals do imitate and conform
then there should be some reason for this. Intuitively, one advantage of
imitation would appear to be the speed that it can give to learning. If we
see innovation as being diﬃcult and thus relatively rare while imitation is
much easier to perform then learning should be quicker if players imitate.
This is surely the case with technologically and scientiÞc evolution. The
implications of imitation for the speed of learning are explored by Levine
and Pesendorfer (2000, 2001). In focussing on long run convergence this
paper has not addressed such short to medium run issues. We do provide
some evidence that imitation can potentially help learning even in the long
run; we feel, however, that its ability to do so is somewhat limited. What
we can say with more conÞdence is that imitation need not hinder learning
in the sense that it can be consistent with individually rational behavior in
the long run. Putting this together, we might suggest that imitation may
be an aid to learning in the short run while not hindering learning in the
long run. Future research hopes to consider this in more detail.
The evolution of an imitation dynamic is fundamentally dependent on
the reference network that players use. Some analysis is presented in an
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Appendix on the implications of players choose their reference group as play
evolves. A related literature concerns network formation (see for example
Jackson and Wolinsky 1996, Bala and Goyal 2000 and A. Watts 2001). This
literature treats the network as the game in the sense that a players payoﬀ is
directly dependent upon the links that he has in the network. In the model of
this paper the network is merely a medium through which the game is played
and so the eﬀect of the network on a players payoﬀs is indirect. It may
be interesting to apply the ideas from the network formation literature in
modelling the evolution of an endogenised interaction network. The question
of how sensitive the convergence of the imitation with innovation dynamic
is to changes in the reference network is also an open question.
As a Þnal remark we note that any interpretation of our results must
take into account the realism of our model of learning. We believe that our
model of learning through imitation with innovation captures key aspects
of individual learning in games with many players. One way to test this
is through experimental work. There has been some experimental work
on imitation and the importance of social learning (e.g. Oﬀerman, Potters
and Sonnemans 2002 and Selten and Apesteguia 2002). There has also
been experimental work on learning in large games (e.g. Van Huyck 1997,
Rapoport, Seale and Winter 2001). Experiments to test the importance of
social learning in large games would be of interest.
7 Appendix 1: an evolving reference network
In this section we generalize the analysis contained in the main body of the
paper by allowing players to change their reference group as play evolves.
In particular, as well as choosing a strategy in each period, players are also
required to choose a reference group. We provide suﬃcient conditions on
how players choose their reference group such that Theorems 1 and 2 can
be extended.
We assume that players are constrained in the reference groups that
they can choose. For a player set N , let U,L ∈ RN denote respectively
upper and lower limits on the size of reference groups where Ui > Li for all
i. Let D = {D1, ...,Dn} denote a topological structure on reference groups
where Di ⊂ N , {i} ∈ Di and |Di| ≥ Ui, for all i ∈ N . A set of reference
group constraints is given by a triple (U,L,D) consisting of upper and lower
limits on the size of reference groups and a topological structure on reference
groups. In interpretation, the values Ui and Li are interpreted respectively
as the upper and lower limits on the size of reference group for player i ∈
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N . The set Di is interpreted as the set of players to whom player i may
potentially refer. Given the set of reference group constraints (U,L,D), we
denote by Ψi,(U,L,D) the set of feasible reference groups of player i where
Ri ∈ Ψi,(U,L,D) if and only if Ri ⊂ Di and Ui ≥ |Ri| ≥ Li. That is, a
reference group is feasible for player i when they are referring to a subset of
Di and when the number of players referred to is between the two bounds Ui
and Li. We denote by Ψ(U,L,D) the set of feasible reference networks where
R ∈ Ψ(U,L,D) if and only if Ri ∈ Ψi,(U,L,D) for all i ∈ N .
Given a stage game Γ = (N,S, {ui}ni=1) and a set of reference group
constraints Z = (U,L,D) we refer to an action as a choice of both strategy
for the stage game Γ and as a choice of reference group relative to the set
of constraints Z.23 For each player i ∈ N , the action set of player i is thus
given by the set S ×Ψi(U,L,D), which we subsequently denote by Σi,Γ,Z . An
action proÞle is given by a vector σ = (σ1, ..., σn) where σi ∈ Σi,Γ,Z denotes
the action of player i. Let ΣΓ,Z = ×i∈NΣi,Γ,Z be the set of action proÞles
relative to stage game Γ and a set of reference group constraints Z.
As play evolves over periods t = 0, 1, 2, ... all players simultaneously
choose an action in each period. We assume that players make action choice
conditional on events of the last two periods; this is a departure from the
main text where only the last period is used. We model the evolution of
play as a discrete time homogenous Markov chain {h(t)}t≥0 on state space
ΣΓ,Z ×ΣΓ,Z .
We assume that each player i uses a good advice heuristic in choosing
a strategy conditional on state a = (σ,R, σ,R). The heuristic can be sum-
marized under a good advice probability function gi : ΣΓ,Z ×ΣΓ,Z → ∆(N).
The value gi(j|a) is interpreted as the probability that player i would select
player j conditional on action proÞle a. If player j is selected, j /∈ Ri and
|Ri| < Ui then player i will choose a reference group Ri ∪ {j}. If player j
is selected, j ∈ Ri and |Ri| > Li then player i will choose reference group
Ri\{j}. Otherwise, player i chooses reference group Ri. Thus, reference
groups evolve by the selective addition and subtraction of members to and
from the group. We assume that
P
j∈N gi(j|a) < 1 for all a. Thus, player i
may always take the option to leave the reference group unchanged. Other
assumptions on gi are as follows:
1. achieves aspiration: if σ = σ then gi(j|a) = 0 for all j ∈ N .
2. good advice: if ui(σ) > ui(σ) then gi(j|a) > 0 for all j ∈ Ri\{i}.
23We assume that payoﬀs are not directly dependent upon reference group choice.
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3. bad advice: if ui(σ) < ui(σ) then gi(j|a) > 0 for all j ∈ Di\Ri.
4. indiﬀerent advice: if ui(σ) = ui(σ) and σ 6= σ then gi(j|a) > 0 for all
j ∈ Di\{i}.
If a player receives good advice, i.e. her payoﬀ has increased over the
previous period, then she may remove a player from her reference group. If
a player receives bad advice, i.e. her payoﬀ has declined over the previous
period, then she may add an extra player to her reference group. If a player
achieves her aspiration, the strategy vector remains unchanged, then she
does nothing. If a player receives indiﬀerent advice, gets the same payoﬀ
even though the strategy vector has changed, then she may add or remove a
player from her reference group. As it stands the good advice heuristic does
not give much leeway in reference group choice. It can easily be generalized,
however, with no eﬀect on Theorem 5, to allow more large scale revisions of
the reference group.
Assume that players select strategies using the imitation and/or innova-
tion heuristics. We refer to the resulting dynamic process as the imitation
with innovation and good advice dynamic, denoted I(ε;λ;Z). The follow-
ing result demonstrate that, for any feasible reference network R, play must
either evolve to a state with reference network R or play must converge to
an absorbing state of the dynamic.
Theorem 4: Let Z = (U,L,D) be a set of reference group constraints
and R ∈ Ψ(U,L,D) be any feasible reference network. From any state a ∈
ΣΓ,Z×ΣΓ,Z the imitation with innovation and good advice dynamic I(ε;λ;Z)
either, almost surely, converges on an absorbing state of the dynamic or will
pass through a state a with reference group R.
Proof: Suppose not. Then there exists a reference group R ∈ Ψ(U,L,D)
and initial state a such that play does not either converge to an absorbing
state or on a state with reference group R. Given two sets A and B we
denote by A−B the set A\(A∩B). Suppose that each player i chooses his
reference group in the following way, where he is selecting a player, according
to the good advice heuristic, and has current reference group Ri
1. if good advice and Ri − Ri 6= φ then select a player j ∈ Ri − Ri. If
Ri −Ri = φ then select no one.
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2. if bad advice and Ri − Ri 6= φ then select a player j ∈ Ri − Ri. If
Ri −Ri = φ then select no one.
3. if indiﬀerent advice, Ri − Ri 6= φ and |Ri| < Ui then select a player
j ∈ Ri−Ri. Else, if Ri−Ri 6= φ select a player j ∈ Ri−Ri. Otherwise,
select no one.
If play evolves as above with transition matrix P and does not converge
to an absorbing state then there must exist a non-singleton set of states
Ψ, indexed a(t) = (σ(t − 1), R(t − 1), σ(t), R(t)), t = 1, 2, 3, ..., T , where
Pa(t−1)a(t) > 0 for all T > t > 1 and Pa(T )a(1) > 0.
There must exist a state a
¡
t
¢ ∈ Ψ such that σ ¡t¢ 6= σ ¡t− 1¢. That
is, at some point some player must change strategy. Any player i ∈ N
either receives indiﬀerent advice, bad advice or good advice in state a
¡
t
¢
.
If a player i receives bad advice (good advice) in state a
¡
t
¢
then there
must exist a state a
³
t
´
∈ Ψ in which player i receives good advice (bad
advice). Further, according to the assumed behavior the only players that
can be added to a reference group Ri are those players j ∈ Ri while the only
players that can be taken out of reference group Ri are those players j /∈ Ri.
This must imply that Ri(t) = bRi for some bRi ∈ Ψi,(U,L,D), all i ∈ N and for
all a(t) ∈ Ψ.
If Ri− bRi = φ and bRi−Ri = φ then bRi = Ri. Thus, either Ri− bRi 6= φ orbRi−Ri 6= φ for some i ∈ N . Suppose that Ri− bRi 6= φ. Given the assumed
behavior (assumptions 2 and 3) this would imply that
¯¯¯ bRi ¯¯¯ = Ui which, in
turn, implies (assumptions 1 and 3) that bRi −Ri = φ (where we recall that
Ui > Li). If Ri − bRi 6= φ and bRi −Ri = φ this implies that ¯¯Ri¯¯ > Ui which
contradicts that R ∈ Ψ(U,L,D). Thus, Ri − bRi = φ and bRi −Ri 6= φ. Using
similar arguments to those immediately above this implies that
¯¯¯ bRi ¯¯¯ = Li
and
¯¯
Ri
¯¯
< Li which again contradicts that R ∈ Ψ(U,L,D). Thus, bRi = Ri
for all i ∈ N and this completes the proof.¥
Theorem 4 allows us to extend Theorems 1, 2 and 3 in allowing players to
choose their reference group. For example, in applying Theorem 1, we have
that: for any stage game Γ and any set of reference group constraints Z, for
which there is a feasible reference network R that has a clustering coeﬃcient
of one, the imitation with innovation and good advice dynamic I(ε;λ = 0;Z)
almost surely converges on an absorbing state. At this absorbing state the
strategy vector chosen is an imitation equilibrium. This is immediate from
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Theorem 5 above by setting R to be a reference network with a clustering
coeﬃcient of one.
8 Appendix 2: The imitation heuristic with inertia
We provide some analysis of the imitation with innovation dynamic in which
players use the imitation heuristic with inertia as opposed to the imitation
heuristic. We recall that the distinction between these two heuristics (as
discussed in Section 2.2) lies in whether a player i will imitate a success
example who is not a costrategist and is earning the same payoﬀ as a cos-
trategist. The following example may help to illustrate the importance of
this distinction. This example demonstrates that Theorem 1 does not hold
if players use the imitation heuristic with inertia. Throughout the rest of
this section we assume players use the imitation heuristic with inertia when
selecting a strategy through imitation.
Example A1: There are 5 players and two strategies labelled A and
B. The reference network is given by R1 = {1, 2, 4, 5}, R2 = {1, 2, 4, 5},
R3 = {2, 3, 4}, R4 = {1, 2, 4, 5} and R5 = {1, 2, 4, 5}. This network has a
clustering coeﬃcient of one. We highlight the following payoﬀs,
strategy vector payoﬀ vector
A,A,B,B,B 100, 10, 0, 0, 100
A,A,A,B,B 100, 0, 0, 10, 100
Assume λ = 0. There exists a cycle of strategy vectors (A,A,B,B,B) →
(A,A,A,B,B) → (A,A,B,B,B) in which player 3 changes strategy moti-
vated by observing players earning a payoﬀ of 10. Note that because players
1, 2, 4 and 5 are using the imitation heuristic with inertia they have no desire
to change strategy; if using the imitation heuristic they would have such an
incentive¨
Given a network R we say that there is a directed path between player
i and player j if there exists a chain of players i1, .., iM such that i1 ∈ Ri,
im+1 ∈ im and j ∈ iM . We say that a network R has a characteristic path
length of one when for any two players i, j ∈ N if there exists a directed
path between i and j then j ∈ Ri.24 We note that the reference network
24See D. Watts (1999) for a deÞnition of and discussion on the characteristic path length
of a network.
41
in Example A1 does not have a characteristic path length of one; player 3
refers to player 2 who in turn refers to player 1; player 3, however, does
not refer to player 1. The following result complements Theorem 1. Before
stating Theorem A1 we modify the deÞnition of an imitation equilibrium
in the obvious way. The strategy vector σ is an imitation equilibrium with
inertia of stage game Γ relative to reference network R if
max
l∈Ri
ul(σ) ≤ max
l∈Ci(σ)
ul(σ)
An imitation equilibrium with inertia is an absorbing state of an imitation
with inertia dynamic.
Theorem A1: For any stage game Γ and any reference network R that
has a clustering coeﬃcient of one and characteristic path length of one the
imitation with innovation dynamic I(ε;λ = 0;R) almost surely converges
on an imitation equilibrium with inertia.
Proof: The proof closely follows that of Theorem 1 and so only the
diﬀerences will be explained in detail. Thus, given an arbitrary state σ
we demonstrate that there exists states σ(2), .., σ(T ) where Pσσ(2) > 0,
Pσ(t)σ(t+1) > 0 for all T − 1 ≥ t ≥ 2 and σ(T ) is an imitation equilib-
rium with inertia. We assume that every player i ∈ N always chooses the
same strategy as a success example and we assume that there is an ordering
to strategies (the same for all players) whereby if a player i has more than
one success example he imitates the success example playing the smallest
strategy. This behavior occurs with positive probability under the imitation
with innovation dynamic.
Consider an arbitrary player i ∈ N for whom there exists a player j ∈ Ri
such that i ∈ Rj . As demonstrated in Theorem 1 player i, and j, belong
to a clique Ri. That is, Rj = Ri for all j ∈ Ri. As play evolves, given
the assumed behavior of agents, the number of distinct strategies played by
members of Ri can only diminish. For example, if a player i is plays strategy
sk in period t−1 and then imitates, in period t, a success example who is not
a costrategist, there can be no player j ∈ Ri who plays strategy sk in period
t or in any subsequent period. Given that there are only a Þnite number of
players there must exist some ti such that for every state σ(t), t ≥ ti, no
player j ∈ Ri can have a success example who is not a costrategist.
Consider an arbitrary player i ∈ N for whom there does not exist a player
j ∈ Ri such that i ∈ Rj . As shown in Theorem 1 player i must refer to a
subset of a clique Rk. Indeed, given that the network has a characteristic
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path length of one, it must be the case that Ri = Rk ∪ {i}; that is, player
i refers to everybody in the clique Rk. Restrict attention to those states
σ(t) such that t ≥ tk. That is, those states for which no player in clique Rk
can have a success example who is not a costrategist. If there is a success
example of player i who is not a costrategist in some state σ(t) then any
success example of player i in a subsequent state must be a costrategist of i.
Given the player set is Þnite, there must exist, therefore, some ti such that
for every state σ(t), t ≥ ti, player i does not have a success example who is
not a costrategist. This completes the proof.¥
The analogs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 hold without further qualiÞ-
cation.25 The analysis, however, is somewhat more involved. In particular,
a complicating factor is the possibility that players in the same clique may
play diﬀerent strategies. As, argued in the proof of Theorem 1A, however, a
dynamic can be assumed in which the number of strategies used by players
in a clique can only ever diminish even if it does not fall to one.
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